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The Decline of Europe and the US: 
Shifts in the World Economy and 
in Global Politics
Robert Kappel
The world is facing a dangerous power vacuum which may last for decades. This vac-
uum is developing because Europe and the US are currently in a phase of relative de-
cline while China, India and Brazil are claiming international standing without being 
able to fill this role.
Analysis
A close look reveals several significant changes in global politics and the world economy:
China, India and Brazil are becoming global actors and are gaining relative strength. 
Together with other regional powers (e.g. Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia), they are in-
fluencing global energy, climate, security, trade, currency, and development policies.
At the same time, however, the aforementioned nations are too weak because they – 
despite strong economic growth – are unable to eradicate poverty in their own coun-
tries, and an extremely imbalanced distribution of income and wealth prevails, re-
sulting in massive social problems. The weak infrastructure, technological under- 
development, and low levels of education of the majority of the population are char-
acteristic of their economic and social situations.
Their ability to effectively lead on a global level is limited as they do not yet provide 
enough global public goods (security, monetary arrangements, development aid). 
Furthermore, they are often not recognised as leading powers in their own regions.
Their alliances, such as IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China, soon South Africa as full member) and BRICSAM (BRICS plus Mexico), 
show a low degree of institutionalisation and a large gap between rhetoric and real-
ity. Additionally, the new regional powers disagree on many issues and thus do not 
constitute a counterpole to the West.
There is a growing normative disconnect between the regional powers, Europe and 
the US.
Keywords:	 global	governance,	regional	powers,	global	economy,	world	politics,	US,	Europe,	
China,	India,	Brazil,	South	Africa
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1.	 Rise	and	Decline	of	Nations
The rise and decline of nations has always played a 
significant role in the more historically minded ass­
essment of international relations. When the hege-
mony of a major power or world power is on the 
wane, the entire world order becomes unhinged, 
as exemplified by the Roman Empire, the Span-
ish Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the British 
Empire (Kennedy 1987; Olson 1982; Hurrell 2010). 
Even though military and political circumstances 
usually play a decisive role, the decreasingly co-
hesive strength of widely accepted value systems 
and established economic relations are factors 
which should not be underestimated. The increas-
ing debt of nations also seems to significantly con-
tribute to their decline (Ferguson 2010).
In an era marked by accelerated globalisation, 
the decisive elements for maintaining a leading 
position or reaching one after a transition period 
are the mastering of economic and political tasks 
in the broadest sense and the ability to provide 
global public goods.
2.	 The	Decline	of	the	US	as	a	World	Power
Despite the vehemence applied by American poli-
ticians to the defence of the United States’ imperial 
(to some extent) behaviour and the affirmation of 
the nation’s leadership role, it is apparent that the 
United States has lost its status as a hegemon. Joseph 
Nye (2010) claims that the US is experiencing a rel-
ative decline, not an absolute decline. Even though 
the US clearly constitutes the world’s strongest eco-
nomic and military power, it is nevertheless struggl- 
ing with severe weaknesses resulting from low eco-
nomic growth and the prolonged decline of the pro-
cessing industry (25% of GNP 40 years ago, now 
12%) – particularly in the field of innovative techno-
logical products (see Graph 3). Additionally, gross 
investment has declined and technological progress 
has stagnated due to low educational standards. In-
dustrial productivity and the increase of total factor 
productivity, which indicate technological progress, 
are growing far too sluggishly to maintain an inter-
nationally competitive leading position. The US’s 
distinct loss of momentum has been going on for 
years,1 leading to an overall decline in driving eco-
1 Additionally, the US economy is characterised by a high state 
deficit, high unemployment, and a desolate property market.
nomic force and appeal, and resulting in a loss of 
global acceptance. Surveys and regression analyses 
have shown that the size of the population, indus-
trial value added and the ability to export are cen-
tral criteria for leading powers, including the US. 
In recent years, the significance of the US has been 
marked by a decrease in these fields. However, of 
far greater importance is that the size of the military 
is no longer all­decisive (Kappel 2010): In an article 
in Foreign Affairs, former President of the Council 
on Foreign Relations Leslie Gelb (2010: 35) empha-
sises precisely this aspect. The development of the 
economy is more important than military strength. 
Countries unable to generate economic growth that 
become technologically weaker are thus less able to 
adequately meet global economic challenges, result-
ing ultimately in the loss of political and economic 
leadership. Gelb maintains that this is becoming ap-
parent in the case of the US.2
American political scientists Joseph Nye and 
Anne­Marie Slaughter take a different perspec-
tive. According to Nye (2010), leadership ability 
does not depend exclusively on military and eco-
nomic power, but also on soft power and ultimately 
on being able to establish and use diplomatic, mil-
itary, economic and scientific networks (Slaughter 
2009). As far as these factors are concerned, the US 
has suffered a loss of cohesive power while that of 
other countries has increased. The soft concept has 
made its way into American foreign policy under 
President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton. 
Despite the political assertions of the US govern-
ment, its current soft power no longer suffices for 
creating peace in the Middle East (neither, how-
ever, does its former hard power), for defeating 
global poverty or for combating protectionism, 
to name just a few aspects. Furthermore, the US’s 
(and also the EU’s) ability to provide global pub-
lic goods by means of their hard and soft power has 
decreased. This observation can be applied to the 
bringing of security, the combating of terrorism, 
the prevention of state disintegration, and to the 
fight against organised crime and the spread of 
piracy and mafia networks.
2 “Most nations today beat their foreign policy drums largely to 
economic rhythms, but less so the United States. Most nations 
define their interests largely in economic terms and deal mostly 
in economic power, but less so the United States. Most nations 
have adjusted their national security strategies to focus on eco-
nomic security, but less so the United States” (Gelb 2010).
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3.	 The	EU’s	Lack	of	Dynamism
Europe remains the world’s largest economic 
area with an approximate 20% share of the global 
GNP. The EU’s per capita income and average pro-
ductivity are far higher than those of China, India, 
Brazil or Russia. In the last three decades, hav-
ing started at a high level, the EU’s growth rates 
are on average lower than those of the regional 
powers. This indicates a lack of dynamism which 
gives rise to a creeping loss of economic signifi-
cance. The following three aspects illustrate why 
the EU is ill­equipped for the future:3
The Lisbon strategy of 2000 stated that by 2010 
Europe was to become the most competitive and 
most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world. However, the implementation of this aim 
has failed due to single-minded actions of some 
nations, a lack of implementation mechanisms 
and incoherent strategies. Nowadays, declining 
productivity, weak growth, structural unemploy-
ment, lack of flexibility in the employment mar-
ket, demographic decline and insufficient immi-
gration are characteristic of the EU. These devel-
opments are supplemented by a very high deficit 
and political crises within several countries (e.g. 
Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Italy, Belgium), and of 
the European Economic Area as a whole, which 
remain unsolved.
The European Union lacks hard and soft power. 
In comparison with the US, the EU is relative-
ly weak in the areas of military, diplomacy and 
foreign policy, as well as business-network pol-
icies and civil society activities, and is even un-
able to bring its political and economic weight 
to bear in the neighbouring Mediterranean area. 
Additionally, it is of no significance in the var-
ious conflicts in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Over the last 20 years, it has been unable 
to establish a coherent policy for Turkey, and its 
migration policy is highly controversial. Nu-
3 There is a currently a debate on whether the EU is an attrac-
tive model and a global actor. Andrew Moravcsik makes it 
clear that the EU is a hard and a soft power. The EU’s civil-
ian and military power capabilities have increased: “In many 
ways Europe is optimally suited to project power in the con-
temporary global system” (2010: 153). Anne­Marie Le Gloan-
nec (2011) emphasises that the EU is a regional power, and 
its soft power is backed by a formidable economic structure 
which attracts other countries to merge with it. Others point 
out inconsistencies of the EU’s presence, capabilities and 
patterns of behaviour; for a critical discussion see Toje 2011, 
Whitman 2010, Howorth 2010.
1)
2)
merous other examples of a waning EU could 
be enumerated (Mayer 2008).
The final and most important argument is the 
fact that the EU is largely preoccupied with it-
self. The distinct navel-gazing gives the impres-
sion that European integration is a prerequisite 
for peace and stability in Europe itself, and 
that it is also a growth machine for develop-
ment and prosperity or perhaps a democratis-
ing and stabilising power for the new member 
states. Yet in the period of globalisation, it no 
longer enjoys the former respect of others as a 
model. Eurocentricity prevents Europeans from 
playing a global role. The predominant inward 
gaze makes them substantially less appealing 
in the eyes of their neighbours (the Mediterra-
nean states) and also less appealing for those 
African states strongly connected to Europe and 
in search of new partners (those new partners 
now including China, India, Brazil, etc.). In even 
more distant countries, Europe has an econom-
ic presence (for example, Germany as an inves-
tor and exporter) but has no significant political 
influence due to its inability to take on a “non­
European perspective” (Mayer 2008; Howorth 
2010). Hartmut Mayer speaks out in favour of a 
new perspective and a new foreign policy which 
bid farewell to exaggerated promises and focus 
instead on taking on global tasks.
4.	 The	Rise	of	China,	India	and	Brazil	as	Regional	
Powers
In the last decade, the global balance of power has 
changed significantly; a fundamental shift towards 
a multipolar world has been taking place (Bénassy-
Quéré/Pisani-Ferry 2011). Even so, an increase in 
multilateralism can only be recognised in parts, as 
bilateral activities are taking shape between hith-
erto weakly linked states in parallel. Freshly bur-
geoning national protectionism and economic pa-
triotism is replacing global governance. At any 
rate, it is becoming more difficult to reach multilat-
eral agreements (climate agreements, world trade 
regulations, nuclear disarmament, et al.).
An overwhelming and unstoppable dynamism 
is predominantly shifting towards Asia and gener-
ating a significant increase of South–South cooper-
ation. Many governments are turning away from 
the US and the EU toward the regional powers, 
new centres with global influence, in particular 
3)
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China, India and Brazil; other states such as Turkey, 
South Africa, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia 
also play a role.4 Above-average growth character-
istically prevails in these states (Kappel 2010).
Export	growth:	China and India have been grow-
ing at an average of 10% for the last 30 years (the 
EU and the US at less than 6%, though both started 
off at a very high level, see Graph 1).
Graph 1: Growth of Exports, 1980−2009 (in %)
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, various 
years.
The average	 growth	 of	 the	 GNP	 of most regional 
powers is significantly higher than that of the EU or 
the US (see Graph 2). This, however, does not apply 
to Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Nigeria and Iran.
Graph	2:	 Average	Annual	Growth	of	GNP,	
1980−2009 (in %)
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, various 
years.
4 Iran and Nigeria are at best weak regional powers with no 
significant economic dynamism, as illustrated by the three 
graphs and other analyses.
At the same time, per capita income has also 
shown above-average growth, however, most-
ly starting off at a low level. In China and India, 
industrial	value	added is growing at above-average 
rates, but Brazil’s and South Africa’s figures are 
significantly lower (Graph 3).
Graph	3:	 Growth	of	Industrial	Value	Added,	
1980−2009 (in %)
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, various 
years.
 The inadvertent economic rise of various regional 
powers is the result of a long-term process start-
ing in the 1970s and 1980s, and not just the result 
of growth sustained in the last five to ten years. 
In his book The	Awakening	Giants, Pranab Bardhan 
gives a detailed account of how China and India 
had set the course 30 years ago by modernising 
their agricultural industries, expanding research 
and conducting market reforms.
The world economy is no longer led by the 
OECD. The dimensions have clearly shifted in a 
way beneficial to regional powers (Nel/Stephen 
2010; Nenci/Montalbano 2011; Subacchi 2008). 
Their rise, particularly that of China and India, 
had already been predicted in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and in the last 20 years, it has become reality.
Brazil, China and India exert influence not on-
ly on a regional but also on a global level, owing to 
the fact that the G20’s importance is soon to exceed 
that of the G7.5 The dynamism is becoming partic-
ularly visible, not only as the global and region-
al actors are increasingly playing a role in shap-
ing global governance (e.g. climate, energy, world 
currency, WTO, IMF), but also as their appeal in 
5 Ngaire Woods (2010: 12) accentuates that the G20 is an agenda­ 
setter and perhaps a crisis­manager but it is “not an institu-
tion which can implement”.
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their respective regional organisations (MERCO-
SUR, SADCC, ASEAN) has increased due to their 
strong economic growth and the fact that they will 
eventually have public goods at their disposal. An 
increase of intra-regional trade and direct invest-
ments on their part contributes to more profound 
exchange and integration.
It is apparent that regional powers are catching 
up and that this process will also galvanise due to 
American and European investors wanting to par-
ticipate in the growing markets with trade, invest-
ments and research (in order to bind scientists, en-
gineers and a highly qualified workforce).
5.	 The	Unsolved	Problems	of	the	Regional	Powers
China’s, India’s and Brazil’s own political and eco-
nomic overestimation and weak “soft power” are, 
however, are obstacles. India, for example, de-
scribes itself as a global power, although it is un-
able to take on real global responsibility or create 
“reliable” conditions in the region – for example, 
in terms of defence and security policies in South 
Asia and in ASEAN (Sisodia/Datta 2008). India’s 
currency is not stable, the country is on a weak 
footing as far as the global economy is concerned, 
and its infrastructure is poorly developed. Its suc-
cess in combating poverty is at best meagre. So far, 
India’s “soft power competence” is small.
China is an exponent of a newly forming world 
order. Its growing self­confidence in foreign policy 
is a result of its economic success. So far, its re-
gional activities and its activities in the interna-
tional forums are not sufficiently directed at global 
governance and global public goods. China’s re-
lations with some neighbour states are of a more 
hegemonic nature. Despite close economic coop-
eration, there seems to be a higher degree of con-
flict than cooperation with India (Kashmir, Tibet, 
Pakistan). China does not yet have enough soft 
power	and has not accrued sufficient esteem. Thus, 
it cannot yet assume a global leadership role. Ad-
ditionally, the number of countries in the region 
that follow China’s agenda is still relatively small 
and limited to internationally controversial states 
such as Zimbabwe, North Korea, Myanmar, Sudan 
and Nicaragua. Other states, such as Vietnam, turn 
away from China toward the US, as China seems 
to be becoming too powerful.
Brazil is important, but overrated. It is a middle- 
income country, which has gone through a period 
of crisis (1981–1993), which was followed by a 
period of moderate growth and limited recovery. 
Brazil coped well with the financial crises (as did 
China and India) and has taken steps forward to 
become a global power. Economically, the country 
is in the process of catching up. But GNP growth 
rates and the industrial value added in the last 30 
years were quite low compared to those of China 
and India. Nevertheless, its global and regional ac-
tivities (MERCOSUR integration, climate policy) 
have been conducive to Brazil accruing great 
esteem in the “Global South” and in the G20.
The further rise of the new regional powers will 
certainly not be linear due to exceedingly incon-
sistent internal situations. Economic growth, the 
size of the population and the size of the country do 
not automatically entail regional, let alone global, 
leadership. The requirements are far higher: reli-
ability, being trusted by one’s neighbours, soft power 
and provision of public goods for the region and 
the world. Additionally, power is relational, mean-
ing there are not just two but several actors aim-
ing for hegemony, and there are also some neigh-
bouring states that do not always comply. Thus, a 
group of 28 small countries, including Singapore, 
are exercising joint vetoes within the framework of 
the 3G (Global Governance Group). They aim to re- 
present the interests of the non-G20 states vis-à- 
vis the G20 (www.news.gov.sg/public).
In the wake of these developments, the transi-
tion to multipolarity is quicker than the EU and 
the US would like. The strategy of integrating Rus-
sia and China into cooperative relations in order 
to eventually return to unipolarity – with the US 
as the leading power – has failed due to more bal-
anced power relations between the US, the EU and 
the regional powers. The frequency of collisions 
between geostrategic interests and interests con-
cerning energy and economic policies is increas-
ing. China is demanding a multipolar currency or-
der that will supersede the US dollar as the lead-
ing currency. It is precisely the weakness of the US 
dollar concurrent with the increase in significance 
of other currencies that leads to uncertainty and 
insecurity in the global economy (Subacchi 2008).
-  -GIGA Focus International Edition 1/011
6.	 Risks	Caused	by	the	Relative	Rise	and	Decline	
of	Nations
The relative rise of Brazil, China and India concur-
rent with the relative decline of the West is by no 
means a constellation within which “coerced cos-
mopolitan solidarity” – as Jürgen Habermas calls 
the new forms of cooperation between the nation 
states of the G20 – will necessarily occur between 
China, India, Brazil, Russia, the US and the EU. In 
my view, it is simply a shift in global politics and 
the world economy. The extent to which many 
countries follow US- or EU-dominated decisions 
has reached an all-time low.
In the G20, regional powers often take positions 
in diametrical opposition to the ideas of the tradi-
tional powers, which is most obvious with regard 
to climate policy, economic protectionism, global 
supply of energy and, in particular, values. In this 
context, it makes no sense to pretend that the in-
crease of wealth also entails the readiness to com-
ply with the West on all issues. The opposite is the 
case: The un­unified West will have to learn that 
China, Brazil, India and other states will refuse to 
be given orders on how to conduct economic, pol-
itical and cultural matters, etc., let alone simply 
adhere to Western values and norms, which often 
display ambiguities6 (human rights and their ap-
plication). Additionally, throughout history – even 
recent history – many European countries and the 
US tried to dominate and exploit small countries.
Indeed, regional powers are aspiring to a new 
order of global politics; they no longer want to be 
followers. They are forming new alliances, and 
particularly countries such as Turkey, Indonesia, 
Venezuela, Iran, South Africa, India and Brazil no 
longer want to be taken in tow by the US (Nel/
Stephen 2010; Flemes 2010). To a hitherto unprec-
edented extent, they resent external hegemony. 
They themselves now try to lead, they clearly at-
tend to their own interests, and they do not com-
promise at any cost (cf. agricultural negotiations, 
6 For example, the West’s embarrassing and notorious coop-
eration with leaders like Mubarak, Qaddafi, Assad, Ben Ali, 
Bouteflika, etc., and with undemocratic regimes such as Libya, 
Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, China, etc. The conflicts 
in North Africa and the Middle East have made it clear that 
the European realpolitik supported authoritarian regimes, 
neglecting the needs of the people and their fight for democ-
racy. The “Arab revolts” illustrate the closeness of European 
leaders to undemocratic power elites in almost all Middle 
Eastern and North African countries and the failure of Euro-
pean hard and soft power and network politics.
world trade, currency, world health, membership 
in IMF, WTO and World Bank).
It is obvious what the new regional powers 
lack: the ability to lead globally, or even just re-
gionally, and to make global public goods avail-
able. The lessons they will probably learn in the 
near future are plain to see; they too rarely take 
global and regional responsibility. Their policies 
are too unreliable for generating trust in the non-
OECD world, and in the EU and US. The notion 
that the governments of smaller states would 
place more trust in the latter would be entirely in-
comprehensible if China, India and Brazil made a 
joint effort to guarantee global security and ener-
gy supply, to combat poverty, etc. However, the 
regional powers fall far short of global and re-
gional solutions. So far, the regional powers have 
emerged as the new poles in the multipolar eco-
nomic systems; they are hubs, but predominant-
ly lack soft power.
Nevertheless, the trend is positive. China, India 
and Brazil have become more reliable and coop-
erative in some fields (e.g. world trade, interna­ 
tional technological standards, sustainability and 
protection of the environment, combating pover-
ty). However, this does not apply to democracy, 
international currency policy, the combating of 
terrorism, and joint actions against the destabi-
lising policies of states such as Myanmar, North 
Korea and Iran. They have rejected compromises 
in climate policy, even though India, China, South 
Africa and Brazil are among those nations most 
severely affected by climate change.
7.	 Whither	Europe?
Due to these developments, the world is current-
ly in a fragile imbalance. The cause thereof is not 
only the relative weakness of the EU and the US 
but also the fact that the transforming regional 
powers have not yet been able to reliably act glob-
ally and regionally. A regional leadership gap, 
along with global and regional governance gaps, 
is already spreading. The world is drifting apart. 
Leadership, order, and global and regional govern-
ance are no longer guaranteed.
Currently, the West is not solving enough glob-
al problems. Europe makes many promises, but 
the incoherence of its foreign policy and securi-
ty policy weaken its ability to act decisively. De-
spite NATO, despite strong positions in interna-
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tional organisations, and despite high economic 
standards, the US and the EU are increasingly los-
ing their abilities to lead and govern.
In many ways, Europe is succumbing to the be-
lief that it can continue without adapting. But the 
rise and dynamism of the “new” is here. European 
foreign policy is inhibited. The tendency to act on 
single-state policies illustrates its weakness. In or-
der to avert further decline, the EU must develop 
coherent European policies for foreign affairs, for-
eign trade, climate issues, energy, finance, curren-
cy, migration, technology, democratic values, and 
cooperation with civil society networks.
It will also have to learn to act and solve global 
problems with the regional powers in the context 
of a mutual (not a unilateral, one-sided) discourse 
on global obligations. This is absolutely essential 
for the successful reduction of the looming global 
and regional governance gaps.
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